For over three decades, Northern Uganda was a fortress of opposition against the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). The scars of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict ran deep, turning elections into battlegrounds of resentment.
Yet over the last three election cycles, the region has shifted, politically. Peace has washed away old grudges, and today, the NRM stands tall and looks primed to dominate the area in the 2026 elections.
How did Northern Uganda, once a no-go zone for NRM supporters, finally embrace Museveni?
The answer lies in the origins of the LRA war. The roots of this war can be traced to 1986, when Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) now UPDF captured Kampala. Northerners, especially Acholis who had dominated the previous army, felt sidelined. Kony’s LRA emerged as a twisted rebellion, blending spiritual mysticism with terror.
By the 1990s, the north was a war zone: villages burned, children conscripted, and IDP camps like Pabbo became prisons of despair. The NRM’s response, Operation North in 2002, drove rebels out but at a cost. Locals accused the army of abuses, like arbitrary arrests and cattle raids, fuelling the narrative of ethnic bias.
This resentment exploded at the ballot box. Uganda’s first direct presidential election in 1996 was a litmus test. Nationally, Museveni triumphed with 74% of the vote, but in Northern Uganda he performed dismally. In the Northern region, encompassing districts like Gulu, Kitgum, Apac, and Lira, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, Museveni’s opponent, captured 64.9% of the vote. Museveni managed a meagre 32.9%, according to statistics from the Electoral Commission (EC).
In Apac district alone, Ssemogerere soared to 76.4%, while Museveni limped at 22.3%. Parliamentary elections, which were held later on, reflected this trend. Opposition-leaning candidates (there were no parties then) dominated, with those allied to the “movement” scraping few seats in a region of 20-plus constituencies. Voters saw Ssemogerere as a voice against the “southern invasion.”
To be fair, turnout was low, due to the treats by LRA threats but where people voted, it was a resounding “no” to Museveni. Like a market woman boycotting a shady trader, Northerners rejected Museveni’s promises of unity.
The pattern held in 2001, amid escalating violence. Dr Kizza Besigye, Museveni’s former physician and a Reform Agenda candidate, challenged the incumbent fiercely. Nationally, Museveni won 69.3% against Besigye’s 27.8% but in the north, Besigye was a hero.
In Gulu and Lira, he polled over 70%, portraying the NRM as the war’s architect. Apac gave him 80%, Kitgum 75%—figures that humiliated Museveni, who barely hit 20% in Acholi. Parliamentary contests saw the “movement” win just a handful of seats, like in Arua’s West Nile sub-region, but opposition-leaning and independents swept the rest. The war’s toll, over 100,000 dead, economies shattered made peace the ultimate campaign slogan.
Besigye’s rallies drew crowds like bees to honey, chanting against “Museveni’s guns.” NRM supporters hid their colours; identifying as one was “abominable.”
By 2006, as multi-party politics returned, the north’s defiance peaked. Museveni claimed 59.3% nationally, Besigye 37.4%. Yet Northern Uganda was Besigye’s kingdom. In Gulu, he took 82%; Lira 80%; Kitgum 75%; Apac 73%. Even in West Nile’s Arua, he edged 57% to Museveni’s 37%. Virtually the entire region, Acholi, Lango, Teso voted opposition in presidential and parliamentary races, with NRM securing under 20% of seats.
The LRA’s atrocities, coupled with UPDF excesses, made NRM toxic. “Voting Museveni was like drinking poisoned water,” said Simon Peter Awich, a political analyst and opinion leader based Acholi.
Amid the Juba peace talks that year, hope flickered.
Tide changes
Then, the tide turned. The 2006-2008 Juba talks, mediated by Sudan, culminated in a 2008 truce. Kony refused to sign, fleeing to DR Congo and CAR, but the LRA’s grip on Uganda snapped. By 2011, camps had emptied and people returned home.
The NRM poured in resources: the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) rebuilt homes, Operation Wealth Creation distributed seeds and livestock, and roads like the Gulu-Kampala highway linked markets. Schools reopened, hospitals stocked.
“Peace was the key that unlocked the padlock,” Awich said.
This transformation rippled into politics. By 2011, Museveni’s vote in the north climbed to 40-50% in key districts, a 20-point jump from 2006. Opposition still led, but cracks appeared. Full embrace came in 2016. Amid multi-party maturity, Museveni hit 60.1% nationally, but Northern gains were stark: in Lira, he polled 55% (up from 8%); Gulu 50%; Apac 45%.
Parliamentary seats flipped: NRM captured 60% in Northern constituencies, up from 20%, as voters credited peace dividends. Besigye, still strong at 35% nationally, saw his northern margin shrink to 40-50%. Rallies shifted tone—from war chants to debates on jobs and roads. Like a farmer switching to hybrid seeds for better yield, Northerners bet on NRM’s stability.
The 2021 elections sealed the shift. Museveni won 58.6% nationally defeating Robert Kyagulanyi of the National Unity Platform (NUP) who got 34.8%. In the north, Museveni dominated: Arua 65%, Nebbi 60%, Gulu 55%, even Lira 52%—reversing 2006’s rout. Parliamentary results mirrored this: NRM got 75% of seats, independents and FDC the rest. Kyagulanyi’s youth appeal fizzled amid Covid-19 fears and economic woes, while NRM’s machine—voter mobilisation via emyooga cooperatives—prevailed.
Why the flip?
Peace was pivotal, but so were defections. Beatrice Anywar, a former FDC firebrand from Kitgum, joined NRM in 2020, citing “service over strife.” Now a minister, she’s a symbol of reconciliation. Norbert Mao, the DP president from Gulu, though not fully defected, is the minister of Justice in Museveni’s government.
Recent NRM primaries for 2026 show the party’s continued dominance: in Northern districts, party candidates won 87% of flags unopposed or via landslides, like Phiona Nyamutoro in Nebbi. Over 1,000 aspirants vied, but NRM’s structure—youth wings, women’s leagues—ensured sweeps. Some critics talk of of coercion, but locals point to tangible gains: electricity in villages once lit by moon and there are universities like Gulu University which are bustling with students.
But the NRM, once the “enemy at the gate,” is now the builder of bridges, in Northern Uganda.
