ASUMAN KIYINGI
Gawaya Tegulle’s recent warning about judicial appointments should dispel any lingering belief that Uganda’s governance crisis is accidental.
He argues that tampering with the bench is equivalent to snapping the spinal cord of a republic. The question is no longer whether the republic is in danger, but whether it still meaningfully exists.
Earlier this year, constitutional scholar Dr Busingye Kabumba wrote that the constitution is effectively dead. His subsequent silence marked a turning point.
It suggested that even persistent legal voices recognise that argument alone cannot revive institutions that power has steadily weakened. When lawyers stop litigating and begin lamenting, the crisis has deepened.
Uganda retains the outward form of a republic, with a constitution, courts, and parliament. However, its internal logic appears reversed.
What was intended as a public system has, critics argue, become one where power is exercised privately, resources are distributed selectively, and accountability is uneven. Public debt, however, remains a shared burden.
At the centre of this shift is the judiciary. A republic depends on an independent bench. Where appointments are influenced by patronage, intimidation, or political calculation, the courts risk becoming instruments of validation rather than arbitration.
Cases that challenge authority are resolved quickly, while those involving powerful actors often stall. This pattern raises questions about whether delays are administrative or deliberate.
The judiciary is not the only institution under scrutiny. Analysts point to a broader trend in which state functions are increasingly personalised. Public authority is exercised with private logic, and national resources are managed with patronage considerations.
This trend is also evident in the conduct of military power. When senior commanders make public statements on foreign policy without parliamentary or cabinet backing, it suggests a shift in how decisions are made.
Authority appears to move from formal institutions to informal centres of influence. Accountability, critics argue, risks being replaced by proximity to power.
Political theorists have described such developments as gradual rather than abrupt. Institutions weaken over time. Civil society faces constraints.
Oversight bodies lose influence. Dissent becomes more difficult. The result is a system that slowly loses its ability to respond to wrongdoing.
In this environment, corruption can become normalised. Citizens adapt to survive. Integrity may carry risks, while silence becomes a safer option.
Public frustration can give way to resignation. Meanwhile, public debt continues to grow, often without clear accountability for how it is accumulated or used.
Despite this, it may be premature to declare the republic entirely defunct. Uganda still retains functioning institutions, even if their effectiveness is contested. Some analysts describe the situation as a republic in captivity rather than a collapse.
This distinction matters. If institutions remain in place, they can, in principle, be restored.
Reform proposals focus on several areas. Judicial independence would require transparent, merit-based appointments insulated from executive influence.
Parliament would need to reassert its oversight role and strengthen scrutiny of the executive.
There are also calls for clearer civilian control of the military, in line with constitutional provisions. Foreign policy, critics argue, should be shaped through formal institutions rather than individual voices.
Another key proposal is to strengthen automatic accountability mechanisms. Anti-corruption systems should not depend on political will alone.
Legal breaches, particularly in public finance and leadership codes, should trigger institutional responses without discretion.
Reopening civic space is also seen as essential. Media, civil society, and independent actors play a critical role in holding power to account. Limiting these voices weakens the state’s ability to detect and correct wrongdoing.
Finally, reformers emphasise the need to change incentives. Corruption persists not only because of individual choices but because systems reward it. Altering those incentives could influence behaviour across institutions.
Warnings from commentators and scholars highlight the risks of inaction. However, history also shows that political systems can recover.
Uganda’s future will depend on whether its leaders and citizens are willing to pursue reform. The republic, critics argue, is not yet extinguished, but it is under strain.
The longer these pressures persist, the greater the risk that they become accepted as normal.
The author is a senior advocate and former minister
